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T HE , A W 0 F B FT1 r. R T C T V.
T N T R 0 D 1) C T I 0 Ii . -
Eleticitv as a ronertv in *,)atter has )een kIrvTr
for centuries. Tts presence in various sulbstances was de-
scribed, we are told, as earlT as 6 1 L. C. - it its real
natire has always been shrouded in mvsterv, though impor-
tant discoveries respecting some of its peculiar character-
istics have been made from time to time. fit withlin the
last few decades reat and important achievements in elec-
trical science have introdluced into modern civilization
practical results far bevond tjhe wildest dreams of the most
sanguine enthuisiasts of a centuirv ago. Pehold the tele-
gra p.' ThatFreat revolutionizer of modern commtInication,
',hich speeds intelli.'ence with the quickness of thoe'ht,
end unites continent with continent, the Eastern anQi the
NTestern hemispheres, so that events in the Old 'Torild re
pu.iblis)ed the next day in the newapa-oers of the 'Ne,,T 'Torld,
nearly half wa roind the globe. The telephone, too, which
enables the more marvellous achievement of personal commu-
nication of friendi with friend hundreds of miles apart,
even the alalities of the voice being reproduced w,.ith great
exactness.
Then follo,,7 in quick succession thie electric lieht,
the electric motor, and the electric railroad,-- these in
the last decade and a half. Fifteen years ago the only
electric currents in use were the feeble cirrents of the
telegraph and the telephone. There was theen not a lineman
nor a workman of anyv kind who had ever heard of the high
tension currents in use to-arnv for the services of lifb t
and power. To-inv electricitv li-'hts our streets, o 1 Y1s-
tness places, o-r 'homes. Mt operrites our street railwasv
ad our manufactories, and (noes an endless varietv o oter
wor] in novel and hiyhlv inpehious Twlvs.
These wonderful inventions and the uses to which
they are put, the innumerable lip'ht, and powver pl,nts which
have :udenlv sprunF into ctive operation, -)nri the vervine
intensity of the current ernloved Lor different purpose-,
necessarilT entail in many cases a conflict. of interests
to hnrmonize which it has become necessary to resort to the
authority of the courts, there to have appliedI the princi-
ples of established precedents in such a manner as to meet
these new coniitions and relations. Thus there have been
rendered within a verv few vears numerous decisions in the
courts of this country which attenpt, to establish the leRal
status of this new element, and the riehts and liabilities
flowinR from its use. To , hat extent, this attempt has suc-
ceeded it i,- my en(Aenvor to show,, in the followine paaes.
It is not my purpose to discuss the law of tele-
raphs and telephones in resoect to the services they per-
form for the -uilic; e. ez., the sendin nd eceiot, o-C mes-
sap'es, etc., nor the law of patents coverin7 electrical in-
ventions. The scope of this investipa,tion will be confined
as nearly as possible to the law of electricity as it. per-
tains to the ri ,hts, duties, and responsibilities of those
who employ it, arisin7 from the peculiar natire of this
mvsteriouis acfent itself, and the a)pparatus necessnrilv em-
ployed in its successful use and operation.
... RITrHT OF STREET RAITLIA7S TO C2-E 10 EfECTRICITY
AI-) A MOTIVE POTR .........................................
This quLestion has arisen in a few recent cases
where street railroad companies oreanized for sone time
have undertaken, in accord with the spirit of industrial
propgress and enterprise of the are, to dispense -,ith the
old, tedious, and slow method of riinnin their cars by
horse-power, and substitute the use of electricity as beinP
cheaper, cleaner, more convenient, les; noisy, and in every
way an improvement i1oon horse-power. Of cour {e an express
authority under a city ordinance would leave no question.
The point has been raised4 where by act of the legislature
a corporation is authorized to operate a street railroad,
and to "us-e the power of horses, animals, or any mechanical
or other power, or the combination of them which the said
company may choose to employ", whether such statute embrac-
ex electricity as a motive power, so that under the statute
a city ordinance might gant and a street railroad adopt it
to be used as a motive power. The contention has been
where the point was raised that because electricity as a
motive power was unkno-wn and not injcontemplction of the
legislature when the act was passed, it was not within the
intention of the legislature.
Tn Hudson River Telephone Co. v W'tervliet Turnpike
& Railway Co., 9 -'.".S.177, Landon, J., delivering: the
odpinion, said:
"The legislators of that day were not ignorant of
the inventive and experimental activity of the aVe, and had
thevyintended to grant the defendant any right to use any
omer except, stec.h, -,,ich sub)sequient invention or experi-
ment mie!ht demonstrnte to be most beneficial to tbhe companv
and to the puiblic, the len'uta~e emploved woulld have been
apt for the pirpose. Ile therefore think the terms and in-
tent of the qct embrace electricitv as a motive power."
PIhe point ie )lso very forcibly and loeicallv pre-
sented by Jistice '-Trant in Detroit, Cit,17 RailwaV v ',Tills,
4-8 -- W. 1009(_Ticb. ), wvhere he says in the course of his
opinion:
gThe P'eneral railroad law enacted in 1855 provides
for the use of the force and power of steam, of enimals,
or any mechanical power, or any combination of them. If
some new motor should be found to take the place o9 steam,
and thereby dispense with the noise incident thereto, rnd
the discomforts of dirt, and smoke, would it be contended
that railroad companies could not, use it inder the urovi-
sions of this law, because it was not known at the time
the law was passed? These laws were enacted in times of
rapid advancement in the mechanical arts. This advancement
is nowhere more forcibly- shown than in the discovery and
uise of devices and motors to facilitate travel and trans-
portation. It cannot in my judgment be held that the lep,-
islature intended to limit, these corporations to the use of
thinis that were then known. This rule would be too ripid
and technical to merit approval. The common law is more
elastic and progressive. It adapts itself to meet the
needs of the people, and the advance of science and civili-
zation. "
These cases would seem to -ettle the laTT on this
point.
- --TI.
........ POLES A:D WTRES FOR EFJECTRTCA., PURPOSES I SIRETS
A D HT HWAYS...............................................
(I). Tele'lrloh and telephone. Tt i well set-
tled that televraph and telephone companies have no rieht
to erect posts and maintain wires thereon in streets or
hishways without, lepislative authority directly Piven or
mediately conferred through proper municipal action, for
obvious reasons applicable Fenerallv to the olacin: of such
things in highways. If such posts be erected within the
limits of a street or highway without such sanction they
are nuisances; but if the erection be thus authorized they
are not.
In etroiolitan Telegraph & Telephone Co. v Colwell
Lead Co., 50 1 .Y. Si-r. Ct. 488, it was held that the lep-
islature had no power, so far as the ri hts of abuttinp,
owners are involved, to authorize the use of the streets of
the city of T ew York for the erection of poles to supPort
telep:raph or telephone wires, the lepislative authority
over the streets beinp limited to ) repulation of use for
which the streets are held by the city in trust, which is
to appropriate them and keep them open as public streets,
and such erection of telepraph poles is not a street use,
and does not come within the terms of the trust. A tele-
graph company cannot, therefore, invoke the equitable power
of the court to restrain interference by abuttin owners
with its poles in city streets; even though its lines have
been erected under leeislative sanction. TThere ,,71- a dic-
tirn in this decision to the effect that n, court, of enliitv
miF:ht refuse nn application of the defendrnts to restrin
the plaintiffs from maintaininF, the poles, )ut it was plain-
tiff who asked for an injunction, rni before the coulrt,
should interfere, they must show that they have a vested
ripht which may be P'reatlv affected by the act soup. ht to be
restrained.
It has been helm that where a city ordinance was
passed in Dpursuance to legislative authority w'hich Pave a
companv permission to erect and maintain a telephone line
in the streets of the city uinder certain regulations, that
after the company in accordance with this permission had
proceeded to expend large sums of money in constructinp:
their lines, and had violated no ree'ulations of the ordi-
nance in respect thereto, that, the company had therelv ac-
quired an irrevocable right to use the streets for the pur-
poses indicated. In the words of the court:
"The notion that a corporation which .under provi-
sions similar to the present act has uipon the strenpth of
a permission to use a certain route suent thoisands of dol-
lars in layinpg railway tracks or subterranean cables, or
in erecting Doles and stretching wires, is at the mercy of
the city authorities continually 1nd entirely, is not to be
entertained for a moment. - - . Tt is opposed to all ju-
dicial sentiment."
Hudson Telep'hone Co. v Jersey City, -9 N.,T. L. 303.
Title 65, Revised Statu-tes of the United States,
@5263 ff., provides that telef-raph companies dulv orPanized
under the laws of any state shall have the rieht to con-
struct and maintain line, of telegraph over and along n nv
military or postroads of the United States declared by law,
but, not so as to interfere with the ordinary travel.
Tn the WTetern rnion Tele'r ,ph Co. v The City of
,ew YorK, 39 Fed. Rep. 552, the Circuiit Co rt of the United
States decided thrat an injunction wouild not be Rranted to
restrain defendants from removing complainant's wires from
the streets of >Iew York City, pursuant, to powers devolved
upon them by the state leislature. (See enactments refer-
red to on p. 17 , post. ) That the act was a valid exercise
of the oolice )ower.
"The privilege to maintain telegraph wires "over
and along post-roads" is not to be construed so literrillv
as to excluide reglulations by the state respectinR location
and mode of constriction and maintenance which the public
interests demand; but is to be construed so as to give ef-
fect to the meaning of Congress, which was to Rrant an -
easement thnt would afford telepraph companies all necessary
facilities, and which to that extent should be beyond the
reach of hostile leRislation by the states. Thus intaypret-
ed the Frant is no more invaded when the repulation re-
quires the wires to be placed in conduits under Rronnd,
than it would be if they ere required to be placed in con-
duits alonR the surface of the streets; and ,when this be-
comes necessary for the comfort and safety of the community,
such a reRulation is as leRitimate as one woild be pre-
scribinp' tlat the holes should be of a iniform or designat-
ed height, or shouzld be located at, given distances apart,
or at designated places alonR the streets. The expense and
the temporary or occasional interruptions and inconvenienc-
es which -re incident to the scheme proposed, constitute
the extent of their sacrifice for the Reneral comfort and
convenience. "
TFut, the court expressed serious do 1bts as to ,'heth-
er the powers conferred bV the rt.'rte statutes in Iucestion
were not nuaatorv to the extent tlIit they permit the com-
plainant to be deprived of the riglit to maintain -)nd oper-
ate its wires unon the structu re of th , elevat'i rrilwav,
that beinp, an independent post-road of the United -t,ntes in
leo:al contemplration, carve oit of the streets u-nori which
its structures are erected; and state lepislation under
whatever power it mnv be classified is impotent to destroy
the privilege given )17 the act of Congress. The uo,'er to
remove the wires altogether from these stru-ctures, and to
refuse to nermit them to be placed there under any circrun-
stances, is not regulation, but is eqivalent to a complete
denial of the nrivilee. An injunction was therefore
P,rented restraining, defendants from ii~terfering with com-
plainant's ise of the struictures of the Manhattan Elevated
Railroad Co for onoerating -nd maintaining its wires.
A very interestin' case decided in V379, -nd re-
norted in 31 . JT. Fq. 627, is American TTnion TelepraT Co.
v Town of Harrison. The comnlainants were oreenized under
the general telegraph law which allowed any corporation
organized under it the right to use the public hihwaVs of
the state for the -ourpose of erectine and maintaining their
lines, moon obtaining the consent in writing of the owners
of the soil. r.ut provided that no posts or poles should be
erected in any street of anyv incorporated town without
first obtaining a designation of the streets in which the
same should be placed, and the manner o,f placinp, the same.
The court held that the mnicipal aufthorities under
this act had the right to repulate but not, to control.
That their rep-ulat, ions must be fair and rea,onable, and
that they have no power to lay an embarp,,o. The re ,l point
at issue in this case arose unon the following facts: Thle
comlatiants T-ere enpaped in the construction of a tele-
Praph line between Iew 'York, nnd Philadelphia, 1,,ihich for
part of the distance passed over territory under the jlris-
diction of the defendants. 7ut the poles were erected out-
side of the streets or hiphways, and upon private property,
although the wires hunR thereon overhunp some twenty streetq
at an elevation of about twenty-five feet, above the roadway.
The poles were erected with the nermission of the owners of
the soil, but vithoit the permission of defendants who made
no opposition thereto, buft resisted the stringing of the
wires by force amountinv almost to riot and bloodshed. The
wires were finally stretched by the exercise of superior
force on tlbe part of the complainants. This was shoin by
defendants themselves in answerina' to comsplinants' bill
which char~ed certain officers of the town with opposing
the hanpin, of the wires, and that defendants intended to
destroy the line by cutting the wires where they overhunF
the streets, and asked that they be enjoined. T
The court said that the section of the statute
which enacted that "the use of the pul)ic streetw etc.,
under this tct shall be subject to such regulations and re-
strictions as may be imposed by the corporate authorities",
was broader than the one previouslv considered, which relat-
ed only to such ise of the streets as woiild be made if
poles were erected therein; and comprehended any ise which
coul. be made of them by a teleg'raph company; e. g. , hang-
inp wirps over the roadwav; that the p-ub)lic easement. was
not limited to the uie of the soil of the hip'liw'y, b)u1t ex-
tended upward indefinitely. Under this claise the town au-
thorities might adoiot re11ations fixing: the elevition at
which telegraph wires shouild cross the streets, and any
other precautions reasonably necessary to the safety of
travel, to which complainants wolfid be obliged to conform.
iut defendants had adopted no such regulations, and never
considered the expediency of exercisin, this power. There-
fore, the facts not showing that the wires in the slightest
degree impecied or endangered the full, free, an(. safe use
of the streets, the complainants in erecting their poles on
Private property and han~in wires on them at an elevation
of twenty-five feet above the roadway, did nothin- bu.t 1,what
they had an utnquietionable legal right to do. And the de-
fendants ,,,ere accordinglv enjoined from cutting the wires
or otherwise inlawfully interferinp with them.
(1) Electric Lipht.--- A different conclusion from
that relating to telegraph and telephone apparatuis has been
reached in repsarx to electtic lishting, and undolabtedlv
with good reason. Tn Tuttle v 7rush Tlluminating Co., 50
T 7. Suipr. Ct. 4-64, it was held that the lighting of the
streets of ew Yorl City under legislative authority was
one of the uses for which the streets were held )v the mu-
nicipal corporation in truest, --- to )e used solely as public
streets. The erection of p~oles for the piirpose of supply-
inp the streets with light would be such a use of the
streets. And the fact that when the act empowerinP the
city to contract, for lightin: the streets was passed, the
lamps were oil lamps placed on poles, and no poles were
needed to carry the conductors to such lamps, would not
prevent the city when an improved method of livhtinR the
streets had been discovered from usin7 such improved meth-
od. And the city has the power to light the streets ')v
contracting with the defendants, and havinp exercised such
power they are the sole an(i exclusive judges of the means
to be employed, so long as thev ao not authorize a use
which is subsersive of and repugnant to the use of the
streets as an open, public highway, and the poles used by
the defendants are not such a use. They have provided that
certain streets are to be lighted by wires carried through
Twenty-fifth Street, and their acts cannot be reviewed.
Such a provision was absolutely necessary. It is impossiblt
to generate electricity at the foot of each lamp-post, and
under such circumstances in order to carry out the power
given to light the streets it was necessary to bring the
electricity to the streets to be lighted. An injunction
to restr inldefendants from placing poles or wires in 2o5th
St., and for judgment directing the removal of such poles
and wires as are now erected was refused. The court, how-
ever, expressed some doubt as to the right to use the poles
for firnishing light lor private purposes. Pro"Dlblv an in-
junction would lie for such a use.
Tn Johnson v Thompson-iouston Y. ectric Co., 5 ,' Hun
4-69, the defendent had a license from the board of t,ru t,ees
of the village of FPllton, muon which was conferred jurisdic-
tion and control of streets therein by the act incorporat-
inp: the village, to erect. poleF and wires in the streets
and grounds of the village for the pirpose of sl-urlying
electricity for electric lights to be used in lightinc' the
streets of the village, and also for private use. The Com-
pany thereupon erected a pole in one of the streets of the
village in front, of plaintiff's premises Tlithout, obtaining,
his consent. He brought, sit restraininc' such action on
the part of the Electric Company, and the court decided that
the license of the board of tristees did not ju:stify the
erection or mainteiance of the pole, and directed its re-
moval. -.ut on ampeal, the Supreme Coutrt,, while doibting
that the -oard could nroperlv aithorize the erection of
poles for the purpose of supplying light for private u1se,
held that the defendant had the right to erect, this pole,
and use it for the purpose of supplying electricity neces-
sary to light the streets in that vicinity, and as e point
from which to suspend a street light, and that this was no
invasion of plaintiff's jiist rights.
It --as held -,)r the Suipreme Court of ,,Tassachnsetts,
in the Suburban Ligbt & Power Co. v Aldermen of 7 oston, 26
E'. F. 447, that a stat'ite nlthorizing the erection of elec-
tric telefraph lines along the public streets and highwavs
so as not to incommode the public; and providing that the
Mayor and Aldermen of a place through which an electric
telegraph line is to pass "shall" designate where the posts
may be located, even if thi4 was imperative, requiring the
, :oard of Aldermen to grant some location for the posts of
telegraph lines, vet other statites extendinp the provi-
sions of these t,,.o sections to electric light companies "so
far as applicable" cannot receive such an imperative con-
struction, in view of the local character of the companies,
of the danger arisinp from their lines to travellers on
the streets, and of the other demands for the use of the
streets by the g eneral public. The coirt said:
"As thic chapter was originallv enacted only with
reference to telegraph companies wlhose lines mist often if
not always pass from town to town and run through different
towns, if it were intended, as the plaintiff contends, that
the officers of one of these toiwns should not have the pow-
er to defeat the operations an Irusiness of such corpora-
tions, and that they shouild betompelled to Frant some lo-
cations for the necessary posts, the same intention would
not necessarily exist in reference to electric lighting
companies, whose operations are usuallv confined to a sin-
gle town, or a part, of a single town, and are of local int-
erest merely. Tt, cannot, ,,,e think, be inferred as the
plaintiff urges that it, was intended not to pu-t it in the
power of local boards to defeat the operations of electric
lighting comnanies, the organization of T,-hich was author-
ized by statute. W Then we observe how many considerations
so far as the public are concerned enter into the question
i. ,..hether the streets shall be used )1 electric lighting com-
panies of a local character, tbe liab.)ilitiesz of the cities
or towns which may be involved, the danger to their inhabi-
tants and to travellers, the other demands for the us:e of
the streets, the necessity or other,.,ise of any ue of the
streets by any such companies, the expenses which rust be
incurred, the character for responsibility of the oarticue-
lar company petitioninp_ it, it, is not, readily supposable
that in regard to companies whose operations were confined
to a single town, all that was intended to be left to the
ocard of Alciermen or selectmen were questions of detail on-
ly."
(3) Electric railways. --- As iteh teleeraph or tel-
ephone comnpanies, and electric light companies, so with
eegislative authority is necessary toelectric railways.
warrant them to be placed in streets or highwavs, which au-
thority may be delegated of course to municipal or local
bodies. Piut the real reason for this latter is that, appli*
cable to street railways penerally.
Are poles and wires an additional serN itude on
abuttinp owners entitlinp them to comuensntion9
Dillon in his work on ,Tiinicin)rl Cori)orations, last
edition, 4698a, saVs:in repsard to tele rapb and telephoneA
"The safer and perhaps soinder view is that such a
use of the street or hiphway, attended as it may be espec-
iallv in cities with serious damage and inconvenience to
the abutting owner, is not a street or Iipshway use proper,
and hence entitles such owner to compensation for such use,
or for any actual injurv to his property caused by -poles
and lines of wire placed in front thereof."
And he doubts the sou-ndness of the distinction made
in some of the cases between whetherthe fee in the street
is in the public in trust for ttreet uses or in the al)it-
ter. He considers the true doctrine to be that the rishts
of the abutter as between him and the public are substanti-
ally the same, wvhethe the fee is in him s)ject to the
public use, or is in the city in trust for street tses pro-
per.
As to street, railways, he concludes that they do
not create a new burden upon the land, and hence no compen-
sation is necessary.
These views are supported by the weip:ht of aulthor-
ity, and certainly seem to be sounolv ju aicial. -ut Dillon
makes no reference to street railways operated by electric-
ity, and here there is a new element to be considered, viz.,
the erection of poles to sipport wires cnrrvinF electricity
necess ,ry for the operation of the cars. iut the reported
cases uniformly hola that this does not imnose an addition-
al ")urden on abittinR, property owners.
In Detroit City RV,,ilwav v Uills, !8 W . 1008, at,
o. 101i, after a carefiul consideration of the question in
relation to street, railways venerally, the couirt said:
"It has frequently been held that telegraph anc.
telephone poles are not necessarilv erected to fpcilitate
the use of the streets, and consequently that they create
an additional servitude. ut the athorities are bv no
means uniform. Decisions to the contrary are based upon
the doctrine that the whole beneficial use of the land has
been taken and appropriated to the pulic, and that one of
the original uses of a hihway was the transmission of in-
tellipence ........ The question a- to ,,hether the erection
of poles for electric street rrailways constitutes an addi-
tional servitude has been several times before the courts,
and thus far they have been held to be ancillary to a pro-
per uise of the streets, and to create no such additional
servitude ......... The poles used 1v complainant are a nec-
essary part of its system. When they do not, interfere, with
the owner's access to and the use of his lanI, we see no
reason why they -hould be held to constitute an additional
servitude. Certainly thev constittte no injury to his re-
versionarv interest. To constitute an additional servitide
therefore, they must be an injury to the present, use and
enjoyment of his land. -lit they do not obstrict his lishht
or his vision, as do the structures of an elevated railway,
neither cto they nor the cars they assist in movinF, cfmse
the noise, steam, smoke, and dirt which are produced by
steam cars. They do not, interfere with his Poinpa nd com-
ing at his pleasure, when placed as they can and must be so
as to give him free access. Wherein, then, is he injured?
If it be said that they are unsiehtly, and therefore offend
his taste, it can well be replied that they are no more so
than the lamp-post or the electric to*ir. It is as neces-
sary that rapid transit be fuirnished to a crowded city, as
it is that light should be furnished to its streets. Pub-
lic convenience must control in all such cases."
To the same effect, are Ta:ppart v T ewport Street
Railway:- Co., 19 At. 326(R.I. ), cited with arnproval in Lock-
hart v Craig Street Railway Co., 21 At. 26(Pa.).
In Tracv v Troy & Tansinpurb Railroad Co., 7 1 *
Supn. 892, plaintiff soulht a temporary injunction to re-
strain defendant from erectingr ooles to form part of an
electric motor system on a street in the villaFe of Tan-
sinpburFh, and opposite plaintiff's property, while his
action for a permanent injunction was penniinv. This was
denied on the ground that the plaintiff would not suffer
irreparable injury or one for which money damap'es would not
be an adequate compensation, while if the injLnction was
granted, "a. public improvement believed to be of ltility
would De obstructed for many months, which in the end mipht
belallowed to proceed."
TTI.---
--- FLECTRTCIT AS A I TIISA CE.---
AnvthinF of such a nature as to b)e inijuriois or
dangerous to the lives, health, or property of the public,
unless kept or used in such a manner as to guard against
danger therefrom, mist, of course, come within the dUfini-
tion of a nuisance. It is admitted that electricity is of
such a nature, and the courts will take jidicial notice
that electricity developed to some high degree of intensi-
ty, for example, is exceedingly dangerous, and even fatally
so to men or beasts when it is brou ht into contact with
them. ut they will not take judicial cognizance of the
fact that its use bv any oarticutlar person or company in
any particular way is dangerous. For it is to be presmed
that neither the legislatuire, nov micipal government un-
der legislative authority, wolId grant anY franchise to
conduct a business in the operation of which was necessari-
ly involved the use of an element or apent in such a manner
as to be primarily and essentially dangerous to human life,
esTpeciall~v when it was to be used in public service or on
public thorolig hfares. These facts must be proveri by com-
petent evidence. (Ta P:art v -,ewport Street Railwav Co.,ante)
After the discovery and general adoution of elec-
tric light for lighting purposes, the number of wires nec-
essary to o-urate the different systems and sunoly the de-
mand therefor, added to the already large number of tele-
graph and telephone wires in large cities, particutlarlv
ew York and Trooklvn, seemed to make it necessary that
some action should be talken to abate the nuisance which re-
sulted from such a network of wires condu-ctinP cirrents of
electricity of varying degrees of intensity, some of which
were in a high degree dangero,:s to life and property, and
mixed together in siich indescribable confusion, as to make
it practically impossible to maintain them in any compara-
tive degree of safety.
Accordingly in 1884 the LeRislature of the State of
Iew Yorl: enacted a law which provided that all telegraphic,
telephonic, and electric lig ht ,,ires and cables in any in-
corporated citv of this state having a -population of 500,000
or over should thereafter be placed under the surface of
the streets and avenues of said cities, before the 1st of
T ovember, 1885. And it was further provided that in case
the owners of the property sholild fail to comply with the
provisions of the act, the loca l governments of the said
cities were directed to remove without del)v all telegraph-
ic, electric lipht, an, other wires, cables, and poles, 
wherever found above Fround, w,,,ithin the corpora, te li-fmits
of said cities.
Compliance with this act having been recognized as
a physical impossibility, in 1855 another act was passed,
')17 w,,'hich it w s provided thatlin cities having. a popillntion
of 1, 000, 000 or over, -,ccordinp to the last censur;, the
,hyor, Comnrtroller, rnnd Commissioner of Piblic Wor- s of
such cities should appoint three disinterested persons,
residents of the respective cities for which appointed, to
constitute a board of commissioners of electrical subways,
whose duty it should be to cause to be removed from the
surface and put, maintained, and operated under Fround,
wherever practical, all electric wires or cables used in
the business of any7 electrical company. Regulations were
also made for the building of the subways under the direc-
tion and approval of the sii.vwv commissioners.
Another ;ct wa s passed in i887, 1y ,hich the -.oerd
of Commissioners in and for the City of Tew York, topether
with the Tayor of said city for the time being, were con-
stituted a board of electrical control in and for the City
of r .ewv York, whose dlities were those previously conferred
upon the su1)v. jT commissioners, -nd in addition was imposed
the duty of notifying owners of the electrical conductors
above ground, when a sufficient construction of subways
were made ready, to place their wires therein within ninety
drvs after notice. And in case it, wa-, not complied wvith,
it w;es made the outy of the Commissioner of Public iTorks to
cause the same to be removed forthwith )v the ',iireau of In-
cumbrances, mioon the written ordrer of the "47vor to that
effect.
Certain subwavs were constrlicted in the City of
New York, but insufficient for the o.ertion of the under-
gronnd wires of certain companies, who also were not allow-
ed to construct the same upon plans of their own. Various
accidents having occirred, the attention of the 7Yoard and
the city authorities was called to the condition of the
electric light wires which were beingr used by those com-
panies; and it being foumd that many of these wires were
dangerouis, because of their want of proper insulation, the
7 oard of Electrical Control iwtified these companies to
discontinue the use of such overhead wires until certified
by the expert of the 7,oard to be in a proper and safe con-
dition. A dar or tl*o thereafter theommissioner of Pliblic
Works was directed by the ,avor to remove all the electric
light wires which were at that date improperly insulated,
and then in position in violation of the rules and regula-
tions of the .oard of Flectrical Control, which he immedi-
ately proceeded to do. The result of this action was the
institution of suits by the aforesaid companies to restrain
any firther proceedings of this nature.
One of these cases in the United States Tllurminat-
inF Co. v "rent et. al., 7 1. Y. Sunip. 758; s.c. 55 H"in 22.
In this cse an injunction order was issued which restrain-
ed the Commissioner of Puablic Works from removin' or causing
to be removed any of lintiff' s poles, -, ires, etc., w'-ere
suit,-ble su.wavs had been provided- and notice thereof given,
without first giving, plaintiff a written notice srecifving
in detail the particular wires or parts of wires defective-
lv insulated, or for other cause needlin repairs or dis-
placement, inti giving plaintiff reasonafle time to repair
and replace the same, and only after the default of plain-
tiff to do this. From this order an appeal was taken. The
plaintiffs contended that the condition of their wires was
and unjust
due solely to the arbitraryArefusal of the onrd of Elec-
trical Control to permit the plaintiffs to repair the same,
without which permit such repairs could not be made; and
that theV were at least entitled to some notice of the de-
fects complained of, that they mig)ht remove the same.
The SiaTreme Court held that on accovint, of the dan-
gerous character of the business which plaintiffs were con-
ducting they were bound to exercise the highest degree of
diligence; and when they failed to comply with this obli-
gation, and human life was threatened in consequence there-
of, the public authorities, or for that matter any citizen,
had the right to remove such danger at once as a common
nuisance, without waiting for the slow progress of the o -
dinary forms of judicial procedure, because "hunan life is
more sacred than the forms of legal procedure." Tn the
words of the court:
"When it is apparent, as in the case at bar, that
the condition of the wires of plaintiff is such thnt they
are dangeroiis to h'iman life, and that, any passerby without
negligence on his part is liable to be struck dead in the
-treet, can it be said for a moment, that the public author-
ities have no power to abate this nuisance, and brotect the
lives of its citizens? Indeed, it, is one of the highest
duties, and if they allowed such a condition of affairs to
continue, they might ma10e the city itself lial)le for the
damages sustained bv reason of their negligence in not re-
moving the common nuisance."
In answer to plaintiff', contention that they
should have notice of defective 7,,res, the court said:
This propositionhinvolves a claim un)on the part of
these corporaitions that the public authorities shall n)er-
form a dity which the law devolves ipon themselves; namely,
the proper inspection of their own apparatis, which is lia-
ble to become dangerous at any time, and the immediate rem-
edying of the difficinlty. It is not a part of the duty of
the public authorities to inspect the apparatus of private
corporations, and warn them when such apparatis becomes
dangerous to human life."
The court held that the claim of the comp,ny that
the -,oa)r, arbitrarily refused to allow reiairs to be made,
that their regulations for makiR these renairs were unrea-
sonable, and that they were conseniuently unable to Iceep
their wires in that condition which their plain duty re-
quired should be done, furnished no excuse to the plaintiffS.
They had ample remedies to compel the " onrd of Electrical
Control to grant permits to repair; the courts were onoen
to them; and if they had been actiated by the slightest de-
sire to put their apparatus in a condition such as would
not endanger human life, they could easilv have fould a way
to remove the obstruction which they claim was placed in
their path !7 the -oard of §lectrical Control. The order
appealed from was reversed.
The arg.ment upon which the court bases its deci-
sion is certainly a logical and forcible one. Even at com-
mon law there is no question but that where a rievance
threatens such immediate injury to life or health that its
removal is necessary at once withouit waitinp for the slower
processes of the law, any individual would be ju-st, ified in
abating it, and without notice to the one by whom it was
created. \,Tuch more so a public official charged withithe
duty of removing obstructions from the streets. Yut abso-
lite necessity is the only justification for such summarv
nrocedure, an~l the person taking such action does so at his
peril, and is bound to show such necessity if action is
brought for the violation of anr prqperty riphts.
Tn a recent well-considered case in the Circviit
Cort of the United States for the 'orthern District of
California, it was held to be a valid exercise of the po-
lice power for the Loard of Su-rervisors of the City and
County of San Francisco to make an ordinance absolutely
prohibiting the stretching or maintaining, of any electric
wire over the roofs of buildings where the evidAence showed
such oractice to be extremely danp'erous, both as being lic-
ble to originate fires, and as obstructions to the extin,-
ishment of fires otherwise originated. (Electric Improve-
ment Co. v City and Countv of San TFrancisco, 4-5 Fed. Reo. 593)
This decision is cert inly in accord with the well esta,b-
lished principles of laInNA voverninp: the exercise of the
nolice power of n state in resnect to the carrying, on of
any business in such a way as to prove a menace to the
health, lives, or prooert~v of the nublic, -- a pu)lic nli-
sance.
uit a court of eq lty will not enjoin the construic-
tion and operation of an electric street railroad, merely
because it is shown that there might be some danger to men
ind animals from the electric current, rnd from the more
rapid running of the c,rs, and that the cirrent wouild in-
terfere with telephone wires in the same street, where no
recent, in jurv is -hown, .nd it is only a remote apprehend-
ed injury of which comToaint is made. (Potter v Saginaw
Union Street Railwav Co., A-7 . W. 217.
-- TV. ----------------------NBL(B E------
Prrctical experience has demonstrated electricity
to be an element in the employment of which for many pur-
poses the greatest hare and diligence should be used to
prevent injiry to person or property. It is a powerful
agent, uise©il beyond any estimable degree when surrounded
by proper s ,feguards and handled with care. Tt once al-
lowed to break its boinds and its effects are disastrous.
It acts s, iftlv and silently, and strikes without a note of
warning. It is highlyT imorts nt therefore that those who
ass-me to provide electricit-T for public service in the way
of light, heat, or power, should entrust its management and
handling only to persons skilled in its use and familiar
with its properties, and be requ7ired to provide the great-
est pobsible safeguiards against injury to the public health
or srfety.
It is true, however, that but comporatively few
deaths have resulted from contact with the electric current,
and a corresDondingly small number of cases are found in
the reports in which actions for damap'es have been brought
for negligence causing injury. This is undoubtedlv due to
the fact that the character of electricity beingp known to
be so dangerous under the proper conditions, persons unac-
rBiainted with its use and management, but thoroughly7 aware
of its effects, exercise extraordinary precautions in its
presence, and avoid it in every7 way possible; while those
who -re employed in its handling and management follow cer-
tain rules and regulations necessary to secure to them safe-
ty therein, and in the case of the few who have become vic-
tims of its Dower through a long experience and resulting
carelessness, their contributory negligence bars the right
to an action. Further, as r rifle, companies employing it
have surrounded it with every orecauitionary device known
for entire safety with ordinary care on the part of people
generally.
It may be well, however, to glance for a. moment at
what amounts to negligence in the use of electricity. One
of the safeguards and necessary precations here referred
to is proper insvilation of the wire conduicting, the current,
where possible, and consistent with its use. Inslilation is
made by means of a non-condi-cting substance placed around
the conducting wire, so that anv contact of a conductor
with the wire thus insulated wolild produce no specinl or
dangeroiis results. It is evident that a neglect to thuis
properlyv insulate a wire conveying a current of electricity
of a high tension from which an injury resilted wouild ren-
der the person responsible therefor linble to an action for
such negligence. Tt has been well said that the only real
difference now between d; ner and safety is between bad and
Rood insnllation.
A late case in Michigan involvine thi- riestion is
thrt of Kraatz v Trlish Electric Light Co., renorted in 46
.. 787. The plaintiff was an emuloye of the defendants,
an electric lipht companv doing i)misiness in the City of De-
troit, fnirnishinR arc lights for lihtinj' the streets by
the tower svstem. and his duty consisted of trimming the
la-ms in the variouis towers. There were several different
circiiits in operation. At the time when Plaintiff was in-
jured he had trimmed the lamns in 12 or 13 towers before he
came to the one where his injury was received. While en-
gaged in trimmini the lam-rs in this tower, some three or
four in nummber, he received a shock of electricity which
severelyv injired him, havin: an effect somewhat similar to
a stroke of oaralvsis, and for which f injirv this action
was brought. The defence claimei that he was stricken by
naralysis, and. physicians on both sides testifieq, one set
that his condition was the resuilt of an electric shock, and
the other that it was a stroke of paralvsis. The verdict
of the jury, however, settled the qiue.stion in plaintiff's
favor, and the auestion remained as to defendants' nepli-
pence. In the circuit upon which was the tower where
plaintiff received the injury, which was numbered 11, the
wires were su)pposed to be dead wires, that is, not charged
with electricity. Another circuit, numbered 4-, ws 'sed
for farnishing light in the day time, and the wires iunon
this were live wires, i.e., charged. The eviderce showed
thr-t the wires 1upon 'o. 1- were -nlced i)art of the lis-tancp
ipon the same poles s those rLpon -o. 11; tht the ins ].Cr-
tion had worn off the wires in pla, es; that when the in-
sulation was worn off any of these.wires, either from fric-
tion or other ca.ses, and. a live anli dead wire came into
contact at the point where they were bare, the cuirrent
woi-tla instantly be conveyed from the live to the dedd wire,
anI pass alono the whole line; that the wires were placed
in such a way on these poles that the wires of one circlit,
crossed those of another, and whenever they sapged or be-
came slack, which was to The expected, tlhe wires of dif er-
ent circuiits wolld touich one another; and that the wires
were actallv in contact in this way at more than one place
that day. The coirt, held that the jury from the evidence
offered had a, ripht to infer that the shocir to the plain-
tiff was caised by one of these live wires cominp, into con-
tact with a dead one at an uninsulated point, andi catsin-'
a. current to pass throuph the dead wire upon which plain-
tiff was workin_; tirther that they were not com-oel5ed to
find out the partic.lar wire, nor the particular place from
which the current was conveyed. Tn the words of the coirt:
"This wolid be qin imossibility, ann such tracinfr and chas-
inR of li _htninp, is not, reniiired." And that it was plainly
apparent that the defendant was ne plip',ent in constructinp
and maintaininR the wires moon the different circ-its in
this way, and set emloyes to handling with bare hands dead
wires crossed by live ones. And the colurt said: "There
was no excuse for it when we consider the deadly natlire and
effect of the electric current passing over the ,ires."
Another interesting case arose in Louiiai1na,, 'Tvhnn V
Lotisiana Electric Lipht & Power Co., reported 6 So. 798,
under the statite giving damages for wronptil death caused
by negligence. The suit was instituted by a father and
mother whose son, Edward, while in the ermploy of the defen-
dant company, was 'illed, as allegei, by defendant's gross
negligence. The defendants set, uio contributwtrv neglipence.
It seems that the laintiff was employed as night oiler )y
the defendant company in the dynamo room of its plant in
the City of ' ew Orleans. Uhile engaged in his d ties, and
pressing some tallow ctown in the box of a dynamo, he cnme
into contact, with one or more wire:-, and was instantly kill-
ed. According to thr testimony of the electrician in charge
of the dynamo room at the time of the accident, the company
was negliFent and careless in an arrangement of wires about
the dynamo, which were -nlaced improperly alone, the floor
instead of running direct, to the ceiling, and that this was
the cause of the death of the deceased. He fDtrther testi-
fied that. he had frequentlv told the manager of the companv
and also the Superintendent, who were in charge of the
plant at differ"nt. times, that there was great danger in
leaving, the wires on the floor and unprotected. 1 o notice
ws ever taken of the warning, except, that they wouild re-
mark that they woutld attend to it by and by, or when thev
got a neT,, superintendent, or some excuse of the kind, until
the day after deceased was illed, when orders ,' ere given
to take up the wires from the floor, and arranp'e them i)rop-
erlv and safely. Tn tlie course of a well consi(ered and
careful oninion, the court says:
"It is lindeniable that the wire or wires which the
youne man touched or which touched him were danperous. Had
they not been danperous they would, not have killed him. He
mieght have received a shock only even becominR unconscious,
but he would not have died from contact therewith. The
company's representatives had been warned several times of
the danp'erous character and condition of the wires on the
floor, -- of tii- uropriety, at, least, if not, the necessity
of rnunning them u to the ceilinF; but the warninp remain-
ed. unhe ,,Ied. The reoresentntives of the comrnanv to whom
it is saia that the warnings Aere -iven denied t}-at, they
ever were, but their denial is of a weak character. The
affirmative testimony, corroborative as it is, outb slnces
the neeative, anr justifies the inference that the notices
aiven were unheeded, bec)us- they Tere forpotten. At, anv
rate it was the duty of the defendant company to have
known of the danperous character and condition of the w, ires.
The knowledFe they ought to h,.ve had the law presumes,
juiris et de jure, theV had. Even if the corMani' s repre-
sentatives had sworn that, they did not kno ,, of the same,
such ienorance on their part wonld not have exculpated them,
A superior is presumed to know, and in law knows, that
which it is his duty to know, namely, whatever may endanger
the person and life of his emplove in the discharee of his
duties. In such cases the siperior is bound specially to
warn the employe of the nature of the dan 'er, and will not
be excused in case of injury, unless he does -rove that the
emplove well knew of the daneer, and, notwithstanding| ex-
posed himself willinvly and deliberat,4d y to it. In this
case there is no evidence that the companv or any of its
officers ever notified Jvhan of the danerous character of
the wires in iuestion about which he had to move, or that
he knew of the same. The burden of positive proof was on
the defendant. The Rreat presumption not to say the cer-
tain proof is that he was tot, llv 1yaare of the same; for
it cannot for one instant be resonablv suprosed that had
he known that by comins into contact, with the wires they
would have stricken him down dead, he would have done so,
thereby comittin' suicide. It, is mr'nifest that had the
wires been laid as is usually done, or even been properly
ine-lated, coming into contact with them would not;have, as
it did, produce death."
The court, then states certain leadinp principnles of
the law of nepliaence ibearinp on the case, as follows:
"~ased on sound reason and justice the law as ex-
pounded by jurisorudence is clear that it is not contribu-
tory negligence to enpaa'e in a danvero'is occupation. (reach
Contrib. Iep. 370. WYood, ,atster and !servant 763. ); t bet
the risk ass2med b, the servrnt is the ordinary hazard in-
cident to the employment, and this is synonvmois with -un-
avoidable accident. (Td. 738.); tb, t unless the act is nec-
essarily and inevitably dangerous, no nerglin'ence can be im-
puted. jr, each Contrib. 'eF. 370. 'Tood, M qster an(i Serva, nt
763. ); that a servant has the right to rely on the care and
trust, the suu-oerior Kno,,ledpe, infori'iJtion, and .i*do:ment of
the employer, and to act upon the presurmPtion that, the lat-
ter wolld not expose him to unnecessrarv ris'rs, ,nl has ta-
ken all necessary precautions. (Td. 681, 738-9, 7V-9, 75i,
763. 2 Thompson Iep'. 97!5. ); that an emplove is not, bolnd
to inquire as to latent blt only as to patent defects;
that he has the rio'bt, to presume that this innou.irv was made
bv the employer upon ,,hom the dutv devolves, and althourv,'h
the servant may know of the defects, this will not defeat
his claim, unless it is shown that he knew that the defects
are dangerous. (Ubiarton ,e . 21A. Wood 1Taster and Servant
786-9. ); that the master is liable for s,1bjetcin the ser-
vant through negligence to greater risks than tk ose which
fairl-r belon to the employment, and the servant,, in order
to recover, need only reie a reasonable nrestmption of
neeligence and faul3t on defendant's part. (Td. 777. 3 So.
863. ); Considering the facts and the law, we are driven
to the conclusion that t,he companv is resnonsible."
The cist of the decision is the point that the com-
pany knew of the dannerous condition of the wires, and did
not specie, lly warn '-Tvhan, and dIid not show that he knew thi
they were of that character.
This same noint, was the basis of another decision
in the case of Piedmont, Tlliminatin: Co. v _Patteson's Ad-
ministratrix, a Virpinia case, in -,hich damap'es were sou'ht
for the death of plaintiff's inteBtate, caused by the neR-
ligence of the defendant company, Twho employed him in their
eltctric lighting business. The evidence showed thrt the
deceased with others went out to look for and repair a
break in the circuit, and provided himself, as did the rest,,
with a shunt-cord, an apparat,us used in repairine such
breaks. The shunt-hord usedi by Petteson was defective in
having the insulation worn off at one end. He found the
break in the circuit, ,,nci in attemptinF to repair it re-
ceived a shock ana was killed. The court, said in the coursa
of the opinion:
"TestinP: the case upon the olaintiff' s evidence
alone, we are of opinion that the evidence frils to maize
oit the plaintiff's case. There is nothinp in the plain-
tiff's evidence to show that the defendant company in any
wa',y i, commission or omission caused the electric current
to strike and n)ass throP' h Patteson and ,ill him; but from
the -olaintiff's own showinp,, the inference of contributoryz
ner'ligence i)v Patte~on, a- the proximate caisa mortis, is
inevitable. He carried w,7ith him his shunt-cord, and al-
thouepFh it was defective he knew its defects, and he select-
ed it, and uised it witholt complaint. Tf in fact, the defect
in the shunt-bord used by Patteson caused his death, the
evidence shows that they were openr patent, and visible to
Patteson who chose it for himself, and ised it, linhesitat-
inp:ly and withoit complaint of his own selection with de-
liberation, and without necessity, reauiirement, or direc-
tion so to do. The servant is bound to see for himself
such risks and hazards as are patent to his observation;
and the employer does not stand in the relation of an in-
surer to the servant aa:ainst injury caused even by sich de-
fects as are known or are palpable to the servant in the
due exercise of his own s"ill and jidment. (Shear & R.
7e. 4< 92-3. Woodl, Mster and Servant, 4326. pp. 679-31.
Td. 44-01, o. 791, note 1. ) The evidence shows that Patt,e-
son had been for mann months wvith a brief interval in the
service of the companv in the same capacity he was in when
kIlled; that, he had been carefully instructed in the care
end attention necessary to hi, own safety in the discharg-e
of his dangerois dity; and that he did know, how to ise the
shunt-cord with perfect s,afetv to himself, and had twice
turned on the current with the shunt-cord but a few moments
before he received the shock that killed him. At. the first
flash Patteson 'rnew that in his lamp the breach in the cir-
cuit was, and that in his efforts to ma_e the connection
great care and prudence was necessary and that there was
no Trmrrv, necessity, uirencv, or reason for his ipujttin
himself in the line of the current, in the only way possi-
ble, by holdin-, the shunt-cord Aith one hand by its metal
end, and at the same time carelessly and inadvertently pit-
tinp his other hand on the exposed end of the line wire,
and thereby make his body a part of the circuiit, throuph
which the current passed and killed him. Tt is not chareed
nor can it be imp)lied that there was any defect in the line
wire,--in the structure or insulation,-- a small part of
the end of the line wire bein , necessarilylleft naked in
ordcer that the set screw miFht be fastened to it in the
connection with the shunt-cord to restore the circlit. Ana
even tlouwh Patteson was foolish and careless Pnoucrh to
catch hold oJ the shnt-cord at itq defective end bplow, its
insulated end, -- at mo,-t, not, tbree inc'hes of it,, -- he r?7o1-lu
have been perfectly safe ano conld not, have been harmed by
the current, had he canupht hole with the other hand of the
line 1ire two or three inches from its ePoosed meta.l end,
where it was carefully and perfectly insulated and Fiarded.
It i< certain that from the very nature and necessitv of
the case, that, but, for the careless andi negligent, act of
Patteson in Fras-oin, the naked end of the line wire, what-
ever may have been the condition of the shunt-cord, he
mould not have been killed or hurt by the current."
The court cites authority for the proposition that
in order to recover for injury caused by negligence, it,
must be show'n that the ne.lipence was unmixed; it. must not
appear by plaintiff' s evidence that his want of ordinary
care and prudence directly contribited to the injurv. Con-
tinuin', the court says:
"We are of the opinion that the plaintiff's own
testimony fails to prove neplisence on the i)art, of the de-
fendant company, unmixed bv the concurrent and co-oneratin
nevliqence of the decedent, but for which the accident
corld not have occurred."
In the United Electric Railway Co., stal. v Shelton,
iA S.W. 863, pla-intiff's horse ws killed by comin into
contact with a wire of the telep-raph and telephone company
which had fallen across the trolley wire of the Electric
Railway Company. The wire of the tele~bopik company had be-
come much imnaired. The fallinv of the wall of a burninF
building brole a pole of the telephone company, causinp' the
telephone i,,Are to break and fall across the railway wire,
and while in this condition plaintiff's horse came into
contact with the telephone wire and was killed. ;oth com-
panies qWere held liable for neglipence in not u inp nrnper
precautions to prevent such an occurrence. The court, said:
"The obligation to see that its road was in Pood
repair, and its machinery in g operatinp order, is not
confined to the immeiialte and abstract presence of either,
but extends to all surroundings that M,)y depreciate the se-
curitv of either. -.oth com-nanies knew of the urprotected
trolley, and the consecluences of aq contact of tll wires of
the one with those of the other. ,oth knew of the unsound-
ness liiKrlv to produce a fall of the one upon those of the
other. ,oth were bound to p'uard ainst suich liJtelihood,
and havina, failed to do so are liable."
These cases show the manner in which the principles
of the la, w of neplieence estr),blished and determined bv n
long' course of judicia l reasoninp, and decision >-ve been
applieri to a new arran'ement of facts,--facts in which a noW
element, of dan.er is involved, -- and how the law adapts it-
self to nev,, circunstances and conditions. AX before stated
the cases of inmirv from neglipence in tlie use of this new
invention, which are found in the reports, are not numerous,
but those cited and discussed show how easily and admirablv
the law adltts itself to such contitions. And in anv
given case it is n)rinci)ually a ouestion of fct as to
whether, takinF into consideration the nature of this new
soirce of power, its use has been attended w,,ith neplience
so that injury results. Then the application of the Pener-




There is Penother element in the use of electricity
which seems natirnllvT to have arisen oit of thc pecltiar
nrouerties of this su)stance, viz., nn interference of one
c rrent of electricitv with rnother feebler current under
certnin conditions, or from certain situations in resrnect
to each other. S-oce her- does not allow, even if knowl-
edge waorranted, a scientific discussion of the nieculiar na-
ture and Proerties of electricity, however nertinent and
helpful it might be to a fuill and comolete unrieratanding of
the proper manner of applinr legil or eciuitable principles
to a case involving this noint. A general view, however,
is necessary.
The uiestion seems to have arisen in respect to
telephone wires and wir-s conducting electricity for light-
ing or power purposes. There 're two Rinds of electric
li'htinp, knon as the incandescent rni the arc light. The
former remuires a less deeree of force and intensity7 than
the latter, but a much lar'er C17. -itv and force of electrit.
ity than that necessary for the transaction of telephone
or telegraph business. Wires ch, rged with thq amount of
electricity necessary for zupplvinF the incandescent light,
when placed parallel with telephone wires or at a certain
angle or within a certain distance thereto, It y induc-
tion upon the latter, and cause other currents of electric-
itv in them, end interfere ,ith their successful iise and
oneration. In oerctinP7 the arc light, as has been stated,
a more powerful current beina necessary, its effect iuwon
telephone service would of coirse be more (isastro. is, even
when the wires are ntaced at, a areater dIistance therefrom.
A case recently decided bv the Suirreme Court of
ebras Ta, anct reported 4-3 T,. W. 126, involved a decision
uPon sich an interference. Plaintiffs, the e)rnska, Tele-
phone Company, pra yed for an inliunction restraiiinP7 the
defendants, the York Gas & Electric Llht Co., frolI inter-
ferinp ,ith the telephone system of plaintiffs in the City
of York. In some places defendants' wires were erected
previous to those of the plaintiffs. And the court held
that the defendants could inot be enjoined under those cir-
clmstances. ,iit where it ws fo7ind that in some places the
plaintiff had first erected wires, the injunction was Pran
ed restr-ining defendants from usina for arc liRhtinr pur-
poses any wires runninp, rallel with and on the same side
of the street 1,ith a telephone wire of plintiffs, or any
,,,,ire used for incandescent liRbtinp nurnoses ,-hich 1as plac-
ed parallel w'ith any telephone wire of plaintiffs within
a certain distance, or for a certain distance parallel.
And not in any case unless strong iron ruard -ires vere
placed at certain distances and in -uch a nosition that the
ipper wires would be prevented from fallinp on the lower.
A further restriction was also laid upT)on the defendants,
viz,, that none of defendants' wires shoiild be used for
electric lighting which crossed any telephone wire of
plaintiff at a less angle than A-5 deprebs, and at least
five feet -prt, and not, in that case unless the ,ires of
3;)
one system were boxee, or unless 'utrd ,;ires ',ere placed to
prevent )nv possible contact.
The court in this case cioes not, seem to bose its
decision upon anV well established principles of law or
equity. Aside from a considerntion of tbh pleadings ani
the evidence in the case, u-oon whicl,, perhnis, the case was
more properlv decided, it simply affirms the decision of
the lower court in respect to the injunction 'ilrea(Iy de-
tailed. The lower court (also refrained from any applfca-
tion of lop'ic or Dr cedent to the case. It fini-s tr,at
great and irreparable injury and damape woild result to tho
plaintiff and its -rooerty, and dIenser -zou-ld result to tze
lives and property of the piiblic, if defe-d-nts' wJires were
allowed to be placed or maintrined as proposed, ani arjluq es
therefore, the abatement of the nuisance, as it were.
There seems to have been no incj irr in repara to the ex-
pense of anyv chanRe, or the utility and benefit to the pub-
lic to be derived from the constru1 tion of the electric
plant. The case havinp< been decided on this point in
plaintiffs' favor in thel ower court, and appealed by it, on
other grounds, the defendant seems not to have raised the
point in the Supreme Court, Lut , accepted the decree of the
lower court without question.
There m, y -e a question as to how far the -Dpsrent
assumption as to th correctness of the lower court's deci-
sion on this point harmonizes with the case of the Ciumber-
land Telephone & Telegraph Co. v 1nitectpteps Electric Co.,
reported in 42 Fed. 273, in the United St -tes Circuqit Court
for the MTiddle District of Tennessee. Com-pl, Ainant owned
and operated a telephone system in the City of a n.shville.
In operating its instrunents each telephone wTas connected
with the ground by what is termed a "grouind wire", through
which the return current, of electricity is carried back to
the earth, rind perhaps through the earth, actin' as a con-
auctor, back to the telen)hone exchanges. Such retTrn in
some form or other is necessary 4o t,1 produiction of ) c1,r-
rent of electricity in every case. Defendants were five
street railways, all operaterl 1 )v electricity, and usin-
what is known as the single trolley or overhead ire. This
wire is siuspended over the middle of the track along which
the electric current passes, descendinF 1)y the trolley rod
mast through the cars to the motor underneath, and thence to
the rails, which are connected tonether~at, their ends, and
which operate to convey the return current back to the dv-
namos at the power house. The evidence, however, establish-
ed the fact that the cuirrent, did not all return by the
rails. Mich of it escaped, became scattered throush the
earth, ascended throug-h the around wires to the telephones,
and seriouislv impaired their operation bv causing a hu-mming
or buzzing noise which drowned tlhe voice of the speaker, aj
often caused the annnciator; in the exchange to fell, nnd
the bells to give false calls, so that it was impossible
for the operators to tell which, if any, of its subscribers
ha*,?lled, and in short, threw the whole system into con-
sion. Complainants souiqht an injinction in enuity to re-
str'in the use of electricity by 4iefendants under anV svs-
tem which make use of the earth for ) return circuit. In
the colirte of the opinion the court says:
".2bt these evils exist to the serious detriment of
the telehone service i, not rienied; bit it lso appears
from the evidence on both siies that they a.-,-e not, a)sullite-
Iv insurmountnble. Tndeed the.e are but few serious rnws-
tions of fact in this case, and these turn upon the rela-
tive oracticabilitv an'. exRense of the severol method- of
overcoming this , ifficultv."
The con-rt then considers severa, l methods which it
was shown would rerngev the evil. The adoption by the de-
fendants of the double trolley system 1)v which a second
trolley wire is used to convey the current, bac!< to the yiv-
namos ,,,ithout coming into contact with the earth at rll,
woult completely obviate t he difficulty. ,ut this it was
shown would not, only entail larpe expense mpon the defendaib
but would disfigure the streets with a, complicated network
of wires, anna render the road very (ifficult of operation
at curves, turnouts, or switches. It, corild onli be used
siccessfully witli a double track, anu the courts had u lni-
formly held, in the :rlmerous cases betT'een the telephone
companies and the electric railways, which had arisen in
other states, that the double trolley hao. been a failure as
applied to sinsgle tra.ks.
It, wa further shown that the evil might -e reme-
died by a return wire attached to each telephone by which
the current is carried directly back to the exchanpe in-
stead of beinR dumped into the earth. This, however, was
also very expensive, doubline, the cost of the electric
plant, and loublinp the number of wires, nlreadv far too
numerous for comfort, bea tv, or safety. "IU)on the whole",
the court snid, ",.:e dleem it imrocticable."
Q'h re was a third device considered 1 v the court,
known aq the"',7cClure :Dvstem", wl.ich conteml ted the em-
olovnment of a. sinple reti-rn ,..ire 1-n)on ea.ch rou:Ite di ;tllrbed
by the railway service, to which each talehone luion th,t
rou-te is connected, r'ni which oner)tes to complet, the me-
tallic circuit. Tt, was believed and aso-iimed that thi- de-
vice if adoptedl bv the comolinant compmany wo,,.ld oiat-
the distutbances prodiuced bv leakape, thouplh there T-,ould
still be sliFht disturbances y)v induction from p, rallel
wires, from which no coimplete relief has been discovered 1v
anv kind of metallic circuit, unless supplemented byT the
use of non-conducting cables, and the transposition of wires.
The case then oracticallv resolved itself into the oluestion
at whose ex-oense should this change be made? As the tes-
timonv tended to show that, the introduction of the 11CCluer
device into tlie telephone svstem of I a shville wold not.
cost to exceed %10.00 to each telephone, the ouestion was
not vital to the existence of either of these companies.
"At the same time," the oninion reads, "as it is
one that confronts the telephone and electric railways in
every city of the country where both -rg used, it becomes
of pgreat imi)ortance. Are the teleohone companies ,.Jhich
have the ripht to use the streets bound t~o confrrm their
business to the demands of these newcomers, thoup-h by so
dioing they putt themselves to lrpe expense? Or ?re the
railway companies bound as r. condition of occupyinF: the
same territory, to see to it that in ooeratin7 their roads
no incidentril damage is hone to their neivhbors'? Tf the
existence of the one was absoluitelv incompatible with the
continued operation of the other, it, might be incumbent
upon us to make a choice between these two great benefac-
tions, • )oth of which will rank amonp the necessities of
modern u1rban life. 7',it as vie are bound to ,sm-czime t ha)t they
can be persuaded to live t,opether in harmonv, the caise vir-
tually resolves itself into a rquestion of liabilityv fo-r
certain damases sustained bV the complninant."
The court then said it, was o(len to seriouis doubt
whether the plaintiff was entitled to invoke the aid of a
court of eniuity at all, if a mere rouestion of dollars and
cents was involved, especiallv when the defendants were
amplv able to make reparation.
"We do not desire, however, to disgosesof the case
upon this ground. We hrivegdeemedlit more satisfactory to
treat this as an origina.l ciuestion, nnd inrnuire ho. far it
may be answered by the application of well settled princi-
ples. We are asked to determine how far n person making a
lawful and careful use of his own -oroperty, or of a fran-
chise granted him byT the proper municipal u,-tthorities, is
liable for damages incidentally caused to another; in
other v.;ords whether the right of the latter to a~n injunc-
tion aoes not, depeni uuon something more than the simule
fact that he has suffered inljury, though his right to an
ndisturbed use of his bwn may ante-date that of another.
Te take it to be well settled, so far a s per-ons onerating
under legislative grants are concerned, that something more
than mere incidental damage must be proved, -- somethinfg, in
fact in the nature of an ab7use of the franchise,--to enti-
tle the party injured to an injunction." (Citing cases).
The court, then enters into an elabora te and exhaus-
tive discussion of the cases involving this question, show-
ing that while there nre a. large number of cases -hre per-
sons have been held liable for an infringement uon the
maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienunm non laedas, they will usu-
ally be found to turn moon questions of negligence or nui-
sance. The court concludes:
'%ubject to these exceptions we understnnd the law
to be well settled tha.t no person is linbl)e for daimag'es in-
cidentallv occasioned to another by the necessary and ben-
eficial use of his own nrooertv, or of a franchise o'ranted
him by the state. TT, 9rinciole is thus stated by Judge
Woodworth in Panton v Holland, 17 Joohns. 9,-99: $On re-
viewin. the cases I am of opinion that no man is answerable
for damages for the reasonable exercise of a right, when
it is ccompanied )v - cuitious re nrd for th b riph'ts of
others, when there is no jist Fpround for the chree of neg-
lipence or iinsii1fulness, and w.hen the -ct is not, done ma-
liciolsly. I"
The court concl.ides:
"The sibs-t,nce of all the cases we have met, with in
oulr examination of this -jestion, -- nnd 1,.-e have cited 1b1 t, a
smnll fraction of them,--is that. where a person is mea]hinF
a la.1,-f7il ise of his own property or of e piblic franchise
in such n, manner a~s to occasion injury to -nother, the
quoestion of his liability will depend unon the fact whether
he has made use of the means which in the propress of sci-
ence and im-orovement have been shown Iv ex-oerience to be
the best; buat, he is not bound to experiment with recent,
inventions not generr llv Rnown, or alopt expensive devices
,/,hen it lies within the power of the person injired to maee
use himself of an effective and inexpensive method of pre-
vention. Hoyt v Jeffers, 30 '%ich. V1A. Tf in the cs)e
inder consideration it were shown that the eoulble trolley
won ld oiie the inju.rv to com-olinant v ithollt epo.;in
defendants or the wn' )lic to inv great inconvenience or to
" ,arp,'e ex-oense, we think it wo-ld be their di-tyv to mrle
use of it, and clonld have no doubt of our power to i(d the
complainant by an injinction; but az the proofs show t r t,
a more #ffectual and less objectionable and exp)ensive rem-
edy is oren to the complainant, -e think the obliFation is
on the telephone compnny to adopt it, ann the defendants
are not, l)ound to iniemnifv it; in other words tli-t the
damage incidentally done to the complainant is not such as
is justly chorea)le to the defendants. Unless we are to
hold that the telephone cnmpanv has r, monoplv of the use
of the earth, and of all the earth within the City of !.sh-
ville, for its feeble cu-rrent, not only as apainst the de-
fendants, 17-t as aFainst all forms of electricnl enerey
which in the poroPress of science and invention may hereaf-
ter recjuire its use,,;e do not see how this bill cn ")e
maintained. "
The couirt thus seems to base its decision finallv
upon the fract that the defendant was not, o-lilty of any nee-
li'ence in the exercise of its franchise, and no wanton or
uinnecessary (iisrepard of th)e riphts of the complainant; but
admittin- that if the double trolley ,.ere shovwn to be r praG
ticnble and not expensive solution of the problem, the fail-
ure or neelect of the defend..nt, to adopt it would be qusi
neelil,,ence, or en tnecessarv disrertard of the rihts of
t ecoinul' inant.
Comu' ring, this case with the one il .t cited, (Clu-
berland Telee.r,ph & Telei)hone Co. v United Electric Co.
it will be observed thyt in the first ca.se the ei~turb nce
was calsed )v ,rc nnd incandescent li<-ht wires, in the lAt-
ter bv a trollelT -,ire used to orerate n s-treet railroad.
Tn the former the disturbances were cau.sed by indiction, in
the letter bv confl-tction throi-'li the earth, principallv,
althoic,"h the ele-< ient, of indiction vas also present,, but did
not, bear uinon the decision of the coiirt. Tn thq first case
the arc light, T,.ire with the riore oowerf-l -urrent was en-
joined nltopether from ruinnin Drllel w'it the+,elephone
and on the same sioe of the street. He, the simila7rity
ends. The la st case refuses en injunction, on the grolind
that the com-Iainant can obviate the difficIlty more easily
than the defendEnt. As has been stated, in the first cnase
there is no discussion of anv method by which the two sys-
tems of usina electricitv c r be harmonized, but seems to
assume there i not, and ruiles ouit the pnarty coming lrast in
the field. Of course the resu.lt in this c;se is simplv to
compel the electric light comparny to plrace its 7,.ires et
such a distnce and in suich a manner that, there wouild be no
interference. {nai the assmpirion easilv follows that this
would not be r Freat u)ndertakin'. Tn the la)tter case, on
the other hand, in order to ha-rmonize the t;"o systems, it
wouila be impossible to consider a. remownl of defendants'
trolley ,ireabt a greater distance from the telephone wire,
i)ecause this wouIld render the operation of the road impos-
sible; t'or t, he trolley ,ire murst be pl tec in the ce-ter
of the street, or -t least at such a (ilstapae from either
side Rc would inevitably brin' it -,itIhin th fiald of in-
(iAUtion uuon the telephone wire on the oT)posite sioe.
Therefore the nssumption follows, that if no prrcticable
method of hrmr~izin the workings of th two uses of elec-
tricity existed or --. shown, it 7,,o'ild be necessarv for the
court to perm-nentlv restrain one system or the other,
-hich in this case, on account of the priority of piFht of
the complainant, would naturally be defendants'.
A very different conclusion in repard to the com-
parative cost and uracticabilitv of different systems of
oier,tin street rrilriads by electricity is reached in
Hudson River Telephone Co. v WF tervliet Turnpike R. R. Co.,
5 :. -. Supp. 72 This case is first, reported in 8 .7
Supp., .here the plaintiff, 7-ho had broug'ht an action apa.i n
the defendant for a *oermanent injunction to restrn, in defen-
dant fLrom oper,tins its glectric railhmev, soljP'bt an injunc-
tion ioendente lite, in thz 3upreme Court, Special Term, on
the pround that great and irreparable in.jurv wo-ld re iult
to it, if the defendant i,as nllo ,-ed to continue the acts
complained of durinp- the pendency of the action. The in-
jury complained of was that already notices in the orevious
cases, viz., the influence of the current of electricity
in the trolley wire over that in the telei)hone -Aire by in-
d-ction, and the disturbance througpb the escaoe of electric.
itv into the earth from defendnt's Twires, plaintiff isin-
the earth as n return circuit. The court avoideI ?n7 dis-
cussion or determin.,tion pion the merits of the qllet,ion
involved, not beinp' nocessr,:rv to the decision nluon the mo-
tion .Lor the inj.mction, r''n-i vrantea the in ilinction -oendentA
lite, iiion pl intif l- ftrni,,hinc; -nn -dtrt,ai"in .. ufficient
to cover r.nv loss -, ich wnoild resiilt to defendant by reason
of the interriuotion of tb.e operm, tion of its railroad. De-
fendant aoPpealed to the ±@nem_1 term fronm this order, -,nd
there the co-rt aeems to hove inqulped in some speculation
.iron the merits of this novel aulestion, conclluding, thot
the ,doption by either oartv of thp "metallic circuit"
would obviate the electrical interference complaine. of bv
the plaintiff, and that it, would be much chea-oer for the
telephone comoanv to constrtIct it than for tT- rail-lav;
that; huwever, if there ,.'ere n o rea ;onable and -ractica )le
method to obviate this interferenice, the defenrT-:nt must
needs desist from the 1use oLP electricity -)s ril7a. mo-
tive power v.pon th, .streets preoccivpied bv the pl'intiff;
but continued the injunction for thirtv dVV2., and until the
de-endpnt should stipulate that the court, mipht determine
on the trial and adjiidge to plaintiffosch recovery for the
expense a)nd damage to it by reason of its constructing a
metallic circuit as might, be just anet ecliitable, and pon
defendant eivin. a bond for the payment to plainti.f of the
amount awarded apainst it. Defendant, then appealed to the
Court of Appeals §fro' this order, ,-h-re the appeal v:as dig-
missed unon the grolund that. the granting of an inju-nction
-endente lite rests within the souna. j-idici-l discretion
of the court of orip'in--l isoiction, and tat thi ds-
cretion is reviewrjble only by thq Reneral Term- and an ap-
peal from the ji drmnnt of the (eneral Term .. old not, be en-
tertrined except where it nlainntppeared ui-o the face of
the comolnint that the case is one in which by settled ad-
judications the pla intiff lipon tha facts stated is not, en-
titled to final relief. (Willi--s v Televraph Co., 93 1 .7.
6,1-0 ).
The court, however, per Andrews, J., poes into a
consideration of the facts in the case, and concludes that
the evidence stronglv preponderates in favor of the con-
tention of the defendant that the single trolley system of
poropulsion of street c~r) by electricit7T is the best in
use, "having reprrd to mechanical, electrical, and fin.n-
cial considerations"; that the s7ubstitu,7tion b17 t'he plain-
tiff of the metallic for the eartJb circuait is practicab)le,
althousgh involving a large oiftlav, and wouild not only ob-
viate the dist ir ances calsed by defendant's road, but
would promote the peneral efficiencv of the telephone sys-
tem. Contininp:, the court savs:
"Wle have examined with care the questions involved
in this case, and we are compelled to say that we entertain
very srave doubts whether the facts stated in thq complaint
and affidavits are sufficient to constitute a cause of aIc-
tion in favor of the olaintiff, and ,-'ether the olaintiff
has any remedy for the iniurv of w1 ich it comolains, except
throuph a readjustment of its 'aethods to meet the ne,, con-
dition cre ted 7 the use of electricity by the defendant
under the system it has adopted. Iut we think we oupht not
to Uispose of the case uuon its merits in this uoroceedinp.
The m estions are new and difficutlt, and courts elsewhere
have clffered un-on thei. The tria-l of the case upon the
merits is now uroceedinc v,7herein the facts will be iudici-
ally ascertained; and in case an appeal shall be taken
to this coi rrt 1JJ)on the final .judement rendered, shll
then be better able than now to determine the ultimat,e
ri~hts of the *arties."
Pinch ?,nd Pecklhm, IJ. , aissented upon the Epround
that the complaint stated no cause of action. A reference
was ordered in the case in the trial court, .n(t the referee
foun(I as follows, in re~arci to the st, thes of the t ,,,o methods
of usiny electricity employed by pl,,intiff and defendant:
Di t the system emuloved by the defendant acted v conduc-
tion tbvu~h the esc p..e of electricity into the earth uon
the ires of plaintiff, and also by induction wherever
considerable
defendant's trolley ,.ire- ran for any distance -or, rnlel or
substantiallv parallel with the 7,.Tires of plaintiff, ond at
a short distance therefrom, --- in each case with the results
noticed in the cases previously cited. The referee also
found that the difficultv coula be obviated b).v the adoption
by the defendant of either the double trolley or storage
battery wv.:tem for running, its cars, or to a considerable
extent by the adoption )v plaintiff of the MJcCluer Device,
or i)v the mse of a metallic return circuit. TuIt that the
cost to the plaintiff of making the latter change, which
was the onl,7 way to prevent a comnlete interference, woutld
greatly exceed the cost to defendant of either the iouble
trolle.7 or stornp:g battery svatems. T uit the referee found
And decided moon the pleadings and proof that. the -olaintiff
had failed to establish a cause of action a-ainst the de-
fendant, and that defendant was entitled to iudgment againt
plaintiff diutissing the complaint.
This decision of the referee as -opealed from to
the Supreme Court. In examining the questions involved the
Sunreme Cort ignored entirely any conclusions or doubts
expressed by the Court of AppewlIs in its decision iismiss-
ing the appeal from the injunction pendente lite, sayinP7 it
( a 9 apparent from the lan7irmPe3 used )v th? court in con-
cludin, its opinion (quotei above), that the whole subject
in controversy was remitted to the trial coi)rt for its de-
termination as an oripiinal question, ani hence came to the
Sm)reme Court on appeal aq an original question in which
there has been no authoritative determination iJ the Court
of Appeals. The Supreme Court first decided that the de-
fendant acquired no right by reason of its franchise to
permit currents of electricity induced 7)v it in the oper-
ation of itq railroad to escape upon the p'ivate property
of the plaintiff, and thus injure or destroy it, or impair
its use, unless the lep-islature contemplated such a result
and provided for it in the r).nt to the defendant, which
related only to the power to be used bv it, and specified
no particulEr mode of its application. Tf the sine'le trol-
ley system ws the only mode of applvinp electricity a: a
motive power to cars, then the authority to use electricity
might be sa.id to imply an authority for the use of that.
system, notwithsta ndinp its in juriois effects upon otlhers,
provided the legislat.tre has the constitutional power to
grant a right to a corporation to invade private rights,
or destroy the property of other corporaitions or individ-
uals. Thpis was a. constitutiona)l ouestion T-hich the court
was not, called upon to examine, as the case disclosed that
the single trollev svstem was not the only method of a-o-
plvinp electricity as a motive nower for the r)roiunlsion of
r ilwav cars. The court savs:
"ITt is doubtless the r:iuty of the court in the exer-
cise of its equitable power to protect as far as iossible
and practicable within legal rules both these grerat modern
improvements; and, as has been intimated by thi- corirt
and the court of apperls when this case was before it on c
motion, save both of them to the public use upon jist and
eauitable orincioles, non at the least possible expense and
burden to the parties. On that motion it was assuned that
the telephone colild change tts system from a ground circuit
to a metasllic circuit at less expense than the defendant as
coul, change from a single to a, double trolley system. The
tria,,l of the action and the report of the referee no,,, dem-
onstrates that the expense of changing, to a. metallic cir-
cuit by plaintiff wouild be over 'i20,000, while that of
changing from the single to the double trolley system would
be but about '33, 000."
Pa court concludes th't the conclusions of law of
the referee were not in harmony Tith the facts found, and
that the dismis. al of the comolaini was error for which
judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.
Learned, J., in a short concurring opinion held that the
case had been -Dracticallv decided I)v the Couirt of Appeals;
that it was held by the court in "rcV-enrv v ,JeTett, 90 .Y.
58, that if in -,nv case the complaint showed no cause of
action, then on an appeal to that court from 7n order af-
firming an injunction order pendente lite, a question of
law arose; that that court ought to decide that question,
and ought to reverse the order. And that in the present
case the Court of Appeals would have reversed the I order
affirming the injunction pendente lite, if they had not
really determined when the question was directly before
them, that upon the facts as shown by the complaint a. cause
of action existed, although they did express "Frave doubts"
upon it, which langlage was "probably used in compliment to
the two judges '.ho disagreed wtth the majority opinion."
"It was the right of the defendant to have a rever-
sal as matter of law, if no cause of -,ction was set forth
in the complaint; and when that court dismissed that ap-
peal, it decided that the covmilaint stated a Food cause of
action. "
The best statement of the real merits of this rjues-
tion, and a decision rendered accardingly, will be found
in the case of the Cincinnati Inclined Plane Railwo,v v City
and Suburban Telephone Ass'n, reported in 27 ,. F. 890.
This is an Ohio case, and w-ithout entering into an unnec-
essary reoetition of detailed facts, it may be said that
substantiallT the same point is involved as in the previous
cases, viz., the interference of electric rr'ilwav and tele-
phone wires. The ori-inal action was broue'ht in the Super-
of CeLV\
ior Court of Cinnati, Soecial Term, bV de fendant, in error,
A
injunction order granted, appeal by plaintiff in error to
eneral Term of Superior Court, wihere order was affirmed,
and appealed again th the Suoreme Court of the State of
Ohio. The decision in the Superior Court follows in fact
ani argunent practically that in the final decision in Hud-
son River Telephone Co. v Watervliet, etc., R.R.Co., supra,
holding that plaintiff in error should ue the doible trol-
1eV system, and without considerinpg the com-oarative expense
to each company. The Sipreme Court eliminates at once all
immaterial considerations from its discussion, and meets
squarelv the teal "bone of contention" in the followinr'
"Conceding that the mode adoioted by the Railwav Com-
pany of proelling its cars by electricity (the sinele
trolley system) is Pn interruption to the telephone service
of the defendant in error, and calculated to imair its
franchise in the manner contended, the innuirv s suigested
whether the Railway Compan- yist yieldl up a usefuil fran-
chise, that the same may be exclusively enjoyed bv the Tel-
ephone Association, or whether the Asociation shall adapt
its system to existinp conditions, --- whether the Company
shall change from the sinp'le to the doible trolley system,
from the grounded to the metallic circiiit, or whether tze
Association shall uise either a complete metallic circuit,
or resort to the McCluer Device. It is immaterial on which
party the evpense of the change may fall the more heavily.
It is a coestion of legal right, and as remarked by Lord
Hatherlv, L. C., in .ttorney eneral v Colnev Hatch Lunatic
Azvlum, T.R. A Ch. 153, cthe simplest courqe as far as re-
Pa)rds the administration of justice is to ascertain the ex-
act state of the law which regulates the relations of the
parties; and havin' done so to oroceed to act 3pon it,
withouit ",anv reference to the difficulties of the cr,se on
the tart of those against whom it is obliged to decide,
leavinF those parties to relieve themselves as their best ca[L
from the position in which they have placel themselves, and
if there be no other mode of escape, to cease to do the
acts which occasion the wrong. .
The court then proceeds with ;' clear, consistent,
and logical discussion of the rights of the parties. Only
a brief outline of the argument of the court can be here
attempted. It is sub stantiallv as follows: The prima.ry
and dominant pirpose of establishing the streets was to fa-
cilitate travel and transportation, and they therefore be-
long to the public for this pirpose. The telephone system
and its apliances is not among the original and primary
objects for which the streets are orened, for they ma'T be
placed elsewhere than on the highway, and vet accomplish
their purpose. And in granting permission to the telephone
company to constrict it,- lines along and upon the highways,
the prohibition is laid upon them, that "the same shall not
incommode the public in the use of such road." Hence this
paramolint easement or estate which the polblic acauires in
the streets, carrying with it a snecial interest in the
adoption of the mostpapproved systems of modern street
travel, cannot be made subservient to the telepraph or tel-
ephone when admitted on the hip'hwav, without the clearest
expression of the legislative will. The telephone company
has no exclusive right or franchise to rue the earth for a
return circuit. The leeislht, ure did not. grant, the rieht bV
general enactment, nor empower the municipal corporation to
eive the telephone Pssociation the exclusive right to make
use of its ttreets so as to create a monopoly. For A-O
years before the telephone was discovered the use of the
earth as a conducting mediTum in the formation of an elec-
tric circuit had been the common property of any electric
enterprise. Ty whet grant or title, then, did it become
the especial, peculiar, and exclusive franchise of the tel-
ephone association? The contention that defendant in error
had acrniired a vested interest in the telephone system as
at present operated before the Railway CompanyT had any
right to use electricity, which right could not, be injured
or taken away bv the state, is qnswered by the fact that
any special privileges are under the control of the legis-
lature, and may be altered, revoked, or repealed. The pri-
marV object or design of the state in Rrantin; the franchi-
ses of telegraph and telephone bompanies is in a large mea-
sure to subserve the puiblic benefit and convenience, and
not the mere pecuniary advantage of the owners of the cor-
porate property. The exercise of their corporate privil-
eges is subordinate to the accommodation of those who trav-
el on the streets and hiFhways, the profit to the proprie-
tors being Ft mere mode of compensetine: them for their out-
Thy of capital in providin- and 1 eeping the public ease-
ment. The court concludes by reversing the judgment of the
General and Special Terms, and dismissing the original pe-
tition.
The 1o,'w upon this branch of the subject is necessa-
rily conflicting in different jurisdictions where the ques-
tion has been treated as an original one. It is yet in a
cnrde and primary state of development, and no decisions caQ
be regarded as finally establishino: the law in any particu-
lar jurisdiction, when it is considered that many new ele-
ments are constantly arising under+he influence of scien-
tific invention tind discovery in this b)ranch of the mechania
art. Tit it would seem that the decision in this case is
the most logical and just of any so far reported upon this
novel and perplexing cuestion. The conflict in mo-t of the
cases has been largely poon the question of what remedy can
be employed to obviate the difficulty with the least trou-
ble and expense. Of course this question must depend mpon
the evidence -resented to the court, which in the present
statuas of electrical science must necessarily be more or
less conflicting, and a jiugment thereon cannot be entirely
satisfactory. It is, therefore, refreshing to study a de-
cision of the question based moon undisputed fundamental
facts, and which determines the legal rights of the parties




- IS ELECTRICITY MAJUFACTURED? -----
The courts have recently had to consider the ques-
tion as to whether comoanies eenerating electricity and
selling it to consumers for power, illumination, or heating
purposes are manufacturing comoanies under statutes exempt-
inp manufacturing companies from taxation. Decision has
been passed upon this point in two reported cases,--penn-
svlvania Common,,ealth v > orthern Electric Light & Power Co.
22 At. 839, and People ex rel. v Trush Electric Tllminat-
ing Co., 45 All). L. ,J. 264.
The effect of these decisions is oracticallv that
such comoanies are manu facturin7 companies, although the
contrary conclusion is reached in the first case, on ac-
count of the statute under consideration. The logical and
sound viewv seems to be that electricity is as essentially
the product of man's skill and labor,--a manufacture,-- as
the production of illuminating gas, or the o)roduction of
ice by artificial means. The court in the case last cited
says:
"When Te attempt to establish the proposition that
the gas which lights one room is a manufactured oroduct,
and the electricity which lights another is not, we are
obliged to rely more upon the definition of terms and the
distinctions of scientists than the actual practical Droce ,
ses and onerations bv means of which reqults in all re-
spects or at least substantially the same are produced .....
The electrical energy ,,hich is manufactured and sold bv el-
ectric lightin7 corporations originallv resides in and is
extracted from the coal which is burned; or more correctly
sneaking from the heat which is produced by the cumbistion
of coal. Electrical energv is orodiced -,t the central sta-
tion. It may be stored up in cells of definite capacity
knol,,n as acclimilators. It, mav be and in fact is measured
and sold in determinate w.antities at a fixed rorice, pre-
cisely as are coal, kerosene oil, and gas. It may be con-
veved to the premises of the consumer uroon a 1,waon, boxed
o in .n accumulFtor, or it may be sent, throulp.h a. -ire,
just as vas or oil maw ')e -transotted either in a close
tanlk or Lorced t,hroipih a -iPC. Tavin reached the premises
of the consumer, it may be uised in any waV he may desire,
beinp: like illiiminatinvp as capable of being trr~nsformed
eit,her into heat, lipht,, or i)ower, ait the option of the
pulrchaser. "
It, has been mv im)ression while collectin,7 the ma-
terial for this thesis that it mist nece, sarilv nrove in-
comprlete and somewrhat. frae'mentary. A review of the ork
only confirms and strengthens this impression. %Tv inten-
tion has been, however, not to state the law of electricity
as it should be, nor entirely as it is, (for it, is as vet
by no means well developed) but to point out, if possible,
the manner in which the courts have dealt ,with a new source
of litigation, and determined the riphts and liabilities of
the parties by long established common law principles log-
icallv applied. ',ore than this could hardly be successfil-
lv attempted when we consider within how short ;i periori of
time reported decisions have become numerous, and the con-
se uent immature and unsettled condition of this branch of
the law. It will be rendilv seen tht it is an important
branch, however, and one that, is bocomine' more interestin
and momentois every year.
In the meanwhile here is a field. in which the law-
Ver may plant the seeds of reason ana jiadgment in denling
with the perolexinp, questions that must arise, inhampered
by old and rock-bound T)recedents which must be followed,
I
with the hope that they will spring irp and bear the golden
fruit of justice and equity for futuire generations.
